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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
The instant case is representative of the willingness of the courts
to grant class status in doubtful situations rather than foreclose the
plaintiff from possible relief.13 0 This judicial policy outweighed the
imperfect constitution of the class which the district court thought was
the controlling consideration in the granting of class action status. 81
In Korn, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed the equitable basis of the
representative suit.3 2
DisMIssAL OF DERIVATIVE ACTION - EFFECT ON NON-PARTY
SHAREHOLDERS
Papilsky v. Berndt
The doctrine of res judicata, which accords finality to judgments
where the parties have had their day in court, is perhaps one of the
most firmly established principles of law. In the context of stockholder
derivative actions and other forms of representative suits, unique prob-
lems arise when the strictures of res judicata are applied. The Second
Circuit, in Papilsky v. Berndt,13 3 has carved out a significant exception
in favor of non-party stockholders, to relieve such potential plaintiffs
from the sometimes harsh effects of the res judicata doctrine.
In Papilsky, a stockholder of Affiliated Fund, Inc. brought an action
on behalf of Affiliated, 134 alleging that the defendant officers, directors
130 See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969). The court felt that the "interests of justice" require that, in cases of using the
class action remedy, it is preferable that the court err on the side of allowing the class
action. Class action procedure allows for modification of the preliminary ruling. Id. at 101.
131 See note 96 supra.
132 See Z. CHArmE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurry (1950) at 292:
However, being much less familiar with class suits, judges do not yet know quite
how to go about it. They are inclined to treat the representative suit as an
ordinary adversary proceeding and to forget the unnamed persons, leaving them
to the tender mercies of the parties in court. Instead the judge ought to think of
these outsiders as somewhat like wards of the court, at least until he is sure that
the representatives are stout fellows who are fighting vigorously for the entire
class.
133 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972).
134 The nature of a shareholder's derivative action is such that he is allowed to
enforce the corporation's claim against the directors or officers who have been guilty of
mismanagement. He has no right to sue and recover damages on his own behalf. He
does benefit indirectly, however, as any recovery becomes part of the corporate assets
in which he, of course, shares.
See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) where the Court said, in dictum, that no
action existed at common law by which a stockholder could make a corporate director
account for his wrongs. Equity made available a remedy in the form of a derivative suit
"to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, directors, and third parties ...
[O~ne precondition for the suit was a valid claim on which the corporation could have
sued; another was that the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable
demand .... Thus the dual nature of the stockholder's action: first, the plaintiff's right
to sue on behalf of the corporation and, second, the merits of the corporation's claim
itself." Id. at 534-35. In Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970),
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and investment advisors of Affiliated failed to recapture brokerage com-
missions paid on portfolio transactions, resulting in higher manage-
ment fees being paid to the defendant in violation of the federal securi-
ties laws.185
The defendants contended that the present cause of action was
identical to the one asserted in a previous suit, White and Bernstein v.
Driscoll,'"0 which was dismissed because of the plaintiff's failure to
answer interrogatories.137 Since the White judgment ordering a dis-
missal was not stated to be "without prejudice", defendants urged that
it was an adjudication on the merits of the claim and thereby precluded
the derivative action brought by Papilsky.
The lower court in Papilsky held that "the dismissal of the White
action was not an adjudication on the merits."1 38 While denying the
a shareholder in four mutual funds brought an action against those and other mutual
funds for violations of antitrust and securities laws. Plaintiff claimed standing to sue in
his own behalf and derivatively; as a shareholder in four of the funds, as a class repre-
sentative of all similarly situated shareholders, and as a class representative of all similarly
situated funds. The court held that "[a]stockholder of a corporation does not acquire
standing to maintain an action in his own right, as a shareholder, when the alleged injury
is inflicted upon the corporation and the only injury to the shareholder is the indirect
harm which consists in the diminution in value of his corporate shares resulting from
the impairment of corporate assets." Id. at 732. Plaintiff's standing to sue as class repre-
sentative of other funds or their shareholders was also rejected. The court affirmed,
however, the stockholder's standing to sue derivatively, on behalf of the funds in which
he holds shares. "[T]here is no doubt that the appellee may litigate derivative actions
in behalf of the ... funds in which he holds shares." Id. at 734.
1'5 466 F.2d at 253. It should be noted that the present plaintiffs had a good cause of
action. Three days prior to the filing of the Papilsky action, the First Circuit, in Moses
v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (lst Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971), ruled that claims
similar to those asserted here did constitute violations of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(a)-i et seq. (1970).
136 67 Civ. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In White, the derivative suits of two shareholders were
combined in August of 1968. In January of 1969, the plaintiffs were ordered to file answers
to interrogatories within one month. These answers were not filed, however, until fourteen
months later, at which time they were returned by defendants as inadequate.
The plaintiffs delayed the filing of answers for nearly nine more months, and again
the defendants found the answers to be unresponsive to the interrogatories. Shortly
thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss the action pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)
(1970) which provides:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party ... fails to obey
an order to provide or permit discovery . .. the court in which the action is
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among
others the following:
(C) An order .. .dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
Defendants' motion for dismissal was granted upon the recommendation of a
Special Master that the answers to the interrogatories were extremely inadequate and
that the delay in sending them indicated that "plaintiffs are not serious in prosecuting
this action." 466 F.2d at 254.
137 "It is undisputed that the claims in the White action are the same as those now
asserted in the case at bar." Papilsky v. Berndt, 333 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
138 Id. at 1086. Judge Wyatt noted that no "notice of the proposed dismissal" was
given to shareholders pursuant to Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
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defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court granted
certification for appeal '39
Recognizing the unique character of a stockholder's derivative
action,1 40 the Second Circuit held that "when notice of a proposed dis-
missal of a stockholder's derivative suit for failure to answer interroga-
tories is not given to nonparty stockholders, the judgment of dismissal
does not bar an identical cause of action asserted by a different stock-
holder in a subsequent derivative suit."141
The court recognized that the effect of this holding was to carve
out an exception to Rule 41(b), 42 which as previously interpreted,
would demand an opposite result.143 A dismissal of a plaintiff's cause of
While stating that he was "inclined to believe that notice to shareholders was re-
quired.. .", id., Judge Wyatt based his decision to deny defendants' motion for summary
judgment on other grounds. He explained that "the derivative suit contains two claims:
(I) a claim by the corporation in which plaintiff is a stockholder, and (2) a claim by the
stockholder against his corporation for its failure to enforce the claim belonging to it ((1)
above)." Id. at 1087. He then concluded that the White action had the effect of barring
the claim of White against the corporation but not the corporation's claim against Berndt.
Id.
While the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the present plaintiffs'
action was not barred because of the White action, it rejected the Court's analysis of stock-
holder derivative actions. The court opined that there is only one claim- the corporate
claim against the defendants. 466 F2d at 255-56. See note 134 supra.1 9 In so doing, Judge Wyatt relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), which states in
pertinent part:
(b) When a district judge in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order.
140 The special character of a derivative action can be seen by the fact that the plain-
tiff stockholder is pursuing a claim which is, at most, tangentially personal to him. He is,
however, substantially affecting the interests of the corporation and all stockholders of the
corporation.
141466 F.2d at 256.
142 Id. at 256 n.5. Fm. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (1970) provides in pertinent part as follows:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him.... Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal
under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a
party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
'43 466 F.2d at 254-55. The Second Circuit admitted that "[a] strict application of Rule
41(b) would seem to require a holding that the dismissal of the White action operated as an
adjudication upon the merits and hence as a bar to the present derivative suit." Id.
The leading case in this area is Costello v. United States, 865 U.S. 265 (1961). Wherein
the Supreme Court stated that "[all of the dismissals enumerated in Rule 41(b)
which operate as adjudications on the merits -failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, or to
comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, or to comply with an order of the Court ...
should, unless the Court otherwise specifies, bar a subsequent action." Id. at 286.
Later, in Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 831 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit,
following the guidelines enumerated by the Supreme Court in Costello, held that the dis-
missal of the plaintiff's suit for failure to answer interrogatories was an adjudication
on the merits where the order of dismissal did not provide that it was without prejudice.
1972]
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action pursuant to Rule 41(b) unless otherwise specified, 144 is an adju-
dication upon the merits and hence res judicata as to subsequent suits
based upon the same cause of action. Consequently, where a dismissal
is made pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,145
such a dismissal is also an adjudication upon the merits, as determined
by Rule 41(b).146
In spite of previous case law which seemed contrary to its decision
in Papilsky, the court agreed with the plaintiff that a different result is
mandated in a stockholder's derivative action: "Courts traditionally
have exhibited understandable caution in according res judicata effect
to a prior derivative action in which the present plaintiff-stockholder
did not participate."'147 Such caution stems from the fact that derivative
actions, like class actions, are exceptions to the rule that where an in-
dividual is not before the court he cannot be bound by an in personam
judgment. 148
In order to ensure that the courthouse doors are not closed to
legitimate derivative claims a legislative remedy has been provided in
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.149 This rule man-
Dictum in Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968), also indicates that failure to
prosecute would result in a dismissal on the merits and hence bar a subsequent action
by a plaintiff on the same claim. Id. at 969.
144 See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 286 (1961); Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331
F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964).
Even where the dismissal is silent as to whether it is granted with or without prejudice
it is deemed to be with prejudice. See Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F.2d
1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969); Kuzma v. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. Co.,
259 F.2d 456, 457 (3d Cir. 1958); Ma Chuck Moon v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 241, 242, (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957); Daley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 90 F. Supp. 562, 563
(N.D. Ohio 1950).
145 See note 136 supra.
146 Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969); Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964).
147 466 F.2d at 257. For example, in Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 968 (2d Cir. 1968), a
dismissal "with prejudice" of a stockholder's derivative suit for failure to post a security
bond was held not to be res judicata as to any non-party stockholders. The court justified
this holding by a finding that defendants had not been put to the inconvenience of pre-
paring a defense (the threshold requrement established in Costello for dismissals which
are adjudications on the merits). Nevertheless, the holding in Saylor marked a departure
from the strict interpretation of Rule 41(b) in the case of derivative action by a stock-
holder. It is also interesting to note that the plaintiffs here argued that the prior dismissal
should not be given res judicata effect to those stockholders who had not received notice
of the proposed dismissal. Id. at 967. The Second Circuit, however, did not find it
necessary to pass upon this contention.
148 7A C. WIGHT & A. MITLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIvIL § 1840 (1972)
[hereinafter WRIGHT].
149 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 provides in pertinent part as follows:
The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders ...in en-
forcing the right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the pro-
posed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such
manner as the court directs.
[Vol. 47:339
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dates that a derivative action may not be "dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to the shareholders or members .... ,O
However, courts have interpreted this notice requirement as necessary
only when dismissals are voluntary.151 There are a number of strong
policy considerations requiring that notice be given for such voluntary
discontinuances.
Requiring notice prevents collusive settlements which would be
adverse to the interests of the corporation and absent stockholders.r 2
In addition, this provision serves to protect non-party stockholders in
situations where the plaintiff must discontinue his suit for financial
or personal reasons. 53 Finally, the rule protects the corporate claim
from prejudice which may result "from discontinuance of a deriva-
tive suit after the plaintiff-stockholder has already secured an advantage
or when the statute of limitations precludes the institution of a new
suit.'u54
Conversely, the requirement of notice has no application where
the dismissal follows litigation on the merits. 55 In such a case the op-
portunity for collusion or fraud is negated by the fact that the corporate
claim has been dismissed by the court following a diligent presentation
of the issues.
Hence, the problem faced in Papilsky was whether in a sharehold-
er's derivative action, a dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories
should be treated as a voluntary dismissal or as a dismissal following
litigation on the merits. The Second Circuit recognized that the dis.
missal here in controversy contained elements of both voluntary and
involuntary dismissals. For example, it is arguable that the dismissal
was involuntary because it was adversary in nature, i.e., plaintiffs op-
150 Id.
151 See Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 968 (2d Cir. 1968); Pittston Co. v. Reeves, 263
F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1959); Mullins v. De Soto Sec. Co., 45 F. Supp. 871, 886 (W.D. La.
1942), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 136 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1943). "Voluntary
dismissals" have also been interpreted to include situations where the plaintiff consents to
entry of summary judgment against him. See Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Topping, 171
F.2d 241, 243 (2d Cir. 1948); Brendle v. Smith, 7 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
152 466 F.2d at 258. See, e.g., Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971). In this case, the settlement of a claim that the directors and
officers of a security fund violated the Investment Company Act was disapproved by the
district court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.
The district judge properly understood that his responsibility was to act as guard-
ian of the absent parties and the corporate fund as a whole. As such, he was en-
titled to consider that the prayer for relief was reasonable and that the settlement,
when compared to the relief sought, was inadequate.
Id. at 774.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 258. See WInGar, note 148 supra, § 1839.
155 466 F.2d at 258; see Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir.
1940) Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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posed the granting of such a motion.156 Additional support for this
argument may be found in the principles set forth in Costello v. United
States. 57 There the Supreme Court held that "a sua sponte dismissal
by the court for failure of the plaintiff to comply with an order of the
Court. .. " should be treated as an adjudication upon the merits unless
the court specifically states otherwise 58 In deciding whether a dismissal
comes within the purview of Rule 41(b), the controlling factor is
whether the defendants have been put to the inconvenience of pre-
paring a defense because there is no bar to reaching the merits. 59 De-
fendants claimed that substantial work had been done in preparing to
meet the plaintiffs claims in the White action and that therefore they
fit literally within the confines of Costello.16°
While the Second Circuit admitted both of these propositions, it
felt that a dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories was more anal-
ogous to a voluntary dismissal.' 6 ' Indeed, the court found that the same
policy considerations which required that notice be given to non-party
stockholders in voluntary dismissals were also present here. 1 2 There-
fore, the court concluded, notice to non-party stockholders is an in-
dispensable predicate to barring such stockholders from maintaining
subsequent derivative actions grounded on the same claim. 63
While an adequate remedy was created for such stockholders by
carving out an exception to Rule 41(b), a question may be raised as
to whether the same result could not have been achieved by using Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 4 By invoking this
provision, the plaintiff could have requested that, although the dis-
missal may be res judicata, it should be vacated for "excusable neglect."
Papilsky's failure to timely intervene and prevent dismissal of the White
action should be excused because she or other non-party shareholders
had not received notice of the impending dismissal. 6 5 In light of the
156 466 F.2d at 259 n.9.
157 365 U.S. 265 (1965).
158Id. at 286-87.
159 Id. at 286.
160 333 F. Supp. at 1087.
161 466 F.2d at 259.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 28 US.C. Rule 60(b) (1970). In part this rule provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, suprise, or excusable neglect . . . The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time, and . . . not more than one year after
the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
165 In Pittston Co. v. Reeves, 263 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1959), the court held that notice
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court's liberal attitude against barring legitimate corporate claims
advanced by non-party stockholders such an argument might have been
pursuasive.
Alternatively, the plaintiff might have argued that the repre-
sentation provided by the White plaintiffs inadequately represented
his interest, thereby activating Rule 23.1. In addition to requiring
notice, Rule 23.1 also provides that a derivation action "may not be
maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and ade-
quately represent the interests of the stockholders . . . .""" While
there are few cases interpreting this sentence' 67 such an argument is
buttressed by the Special Master's finding in White that the plaintiffs
"were not serious in prosecuting the action .... ,,1"8 Such a literal
interpretation of 'adequately represented' seems consistent with the
legislative intent of Rule 23.1.
Even without the aid of Rule 23.1 considerable doubt was raised
by the court itself as to whether the representation provided by the
White plaintiff met the standards of due process. 16 9 While the Second
Circuit found it unnecessary to decide this issue, such a finding would
have obviated the necessity of creating an exception to the rule.
In conclusion, the Papilsky decision has provided a substantial
remedy to non-party stockholders. While the exception to Rule 41(b)
was limited by the court to "dismissals for failure to answer inter-
rogatories,"'.70 a logical extension of this exception in derivative actions
will be its future application to other pre-trial dismissals granted under
Rule 37.
of a proposed voluntary dismissal must be given to stockholders and if such notice is not
given a motion to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) must be granted.
Alternatively, the plaintiff could have argued that neglect or lack of diligence by
White's attorney constituted grounds for vacating the judgment because of "excusable
neglect." There is some support for a contrary position. In Geigel v. Sea Land Service, Inc.,
44 F.R.D. 1 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1968), the Court found that the plaintiffs were not entitled
to have the dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories vacated. The court rejected
plaintiff's argument that his attorney's unexcused or negligent conduct demanded a dis-
missal under Rule 60(b).
However, it should be noted that Geigel did not involve a stockholder's derivative
action, the distinction which the Second Circuit used to distinguish Papilsky from Costello
and Nasser. 466 F.2d at 256-57.
While the negligence of 'white's attorney is imputable to White, it should not be
imputed to Papilsky, a nonparty shareholder.
166 See note 149 supra.
167 See WRIGHr, note 148 supra at 593.
168 333 F.2d at 1086.
169 466 F.2d at 259-60.
170 466 F.2d at 259.
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